

Fixing Austria's Budget and Climate Gap Together

A sourced assessment of the deficit, the government's plan, and a combined package of carbon pricing, a tax shift and structural reform

Prepared with Claude for Merlin

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1 Summary

Austria is a rich country with a public-finance problem that will not fix itself. The general government deficit was 4.2% of GDP in 2025 and the debt ratio 81.5% [S1]. The government plans to bring the deficit to 3.0% by 2028 [S6]; the independent Fiscal Council expects 3.8% instead, with debt still rising to 87.8% of GDP by 2030 [S2]. The core issue is structural: spending of about 55% of GDP, pension and health costs that grow with an ageing population, rising interest payments, and sub-national governments that spend without raising their own revenue.

This report assesses a combined package with four pillars: (1) pricing carbon and dismantling climate-harmful subsidies, (2) shifting the tax mix from labour towards pollution and large inheritances, (3) removing the non-price barriers to electrification, and (4) structural pension and federalism reform. The main findings are:

- **The green and wealth levers help, but cannot close the gap alone.** An illustrative calculation in Section 8 puts their combined net budget effect at roughly EUR 1.5–4 bn per year by 2028, against a gap of about EUR 4.5 bn implied by the Fiscal Council's forecast. Under the Finance Ministry's own (more optimistic) path the gap is zero, and the same levers would instead fund a labour-tax cut.
- **Climate policy is also fiscal policy.** Austria is not on track for its 2030 EU target for non-ETS emissions [S18] [S19]; missing it could mean buying allowances from other member states, which the Court of Audit once estimated at up to EUR 9.2 bn [S20].

- **The current plan barely uses the green lever.** Climate-harmful subsidies account for 4% of the 2028 consolidation measures [S6], while WIFO estimates these subsidies at EUR 4.1–5.7 bn per year [S15].
- **Structural reform remains unavoidable.** To stabilise the debt ratio, the Fiscal Council estimates an average deficit of 2.5% of GDP over 2026–2030 is needed [S2], well below any current forecast.

All numbers are listed with their sources in Appendix A so that every table and figure can be recomputed. Where a figure was read from a chart, comes from an older data vintage, or relies on a secondary report, this is flagged.

2 Where Austria stands

2.1 Deficit and debt

Figure 1 shows the general government balance and debt ratio since 2019, together with the two competing forecasts for 2026–2030 and the Finance Ministry’s own counterfactual “without consolidation”.




Figure 1: General government balance and debt, % of GDP. Actuals 2019–2025; forecasts 2026–2030 from the Fiscal Council (FISK, June 2026) and the Finance Ministry (BMF, June 2026). Dotted: BMF counterfactual without consolidation measures. 2019–2021 from older data vintages. Sources: S1–S6.

Three things stand out. First, the 2020–21 pandemic deficits were followed by renewed deficits from 2024, when the economy was in recession (real GDP -0.7% in 2024 [S6]). Second, the two official forecasts diverge sharply after 2026: the Ministry expects to meet the 3% limit in 2028, the Fiscal Council does not, which is why it assumes the EU excessive deficit procedure will be extended [S2]. Third, the Ministry’s own counterfactual shows how much is already being done: without consolidation the 2028 deficit would be about 5.5% and debt over 91% of GDP [S6].

2.2 Revenue and spending

Table 1: Key general-government figures. Balance and ratios calculated from Statistik Austria data [S1]; small rounding differences to the published balance are possible.

	2022	2023	2024	2025
Revenue (EUR bn)	222.7	237.7	250.2	261.5
Expenditure (EUR bn)	238.0	250.0	273.2	283.0
Balance (EUR bn)	-15.3	-12.3	-23.0	-21.5
Expenditure, % of GDP (<i>calc.</i>)	53.0	52.3	55.3	55.2
Revenue, % of GDP (<i>calc.</i>)	49.6	49.7	50.6	51.0
Interest, % of GDP (<i>calc.</i>)	1.0	1.2	1.5	1.6

Spending reached about 55% of GDP in 2025 and revenue about 51% (Table 1). The growth since 2022 is concentrated in social benefits (+EUR 26 bn, largely pensions and unemployment-related payments) and personnel costs (+EUR 12 bn), while crisis subsidies have been falling since 2022 (Figure 2). Statistik Austria attributes the 2025 rise in social benefits mainly to pensions and unemployment spending, and the rise in social benefits in kind to health costs [S1]. Interest spending nearly doubled from EUR 4.3 bn to EUR 8.3 bn in three years [S1], and the Ministry expects it to reach about 2.5% of GDP by 2031 [S6].




Figure 2: General government expenditure by category, 2022 vs 2025, EUR bn. Source: Statistik Austria [S1].

2.3 Why the deficit is structural

The deficit is not just a recession effect. Several drivers are permanent or slow-moving:

- **Pensions.** Federal transfers to the statutory pension insurance rose from 2.45% of GDP in 2018 to 3.45% in 2024 and are projected at 4.23% by 2030 by the Pension Commission [S8]. This is contested: the Chamber of Labour points to the EU Ageing Report 2024, in which total public pension spending moves only from 13.8% of GDP (2013) to 14.0% (2070), because civil-servant pensions shrink as the statutory system grows [S9]. Both statements can be true at once; the fiscal pressure is concentrated in the next decade.
- **Revenue measures that are permanent.** Ending bracket creep (“kalte Progression”) from 2023 cost about EUR 3.5 bn in 2024 alone, according to the then Finance Minister [S10]. It was arguably fair, but it removed the automatic revenue boost that inflation used to deliver.
- **Ageing, interest and defence.** The Fiscal Council names rising health, long-term care and pension spending, higher interest and additional defence spending as the main forces working against consolidation [S2].
- **Federalism.** In 2025 the Länder ran a deficit of EUR 2.3 bn and the municipalities EUR 3.3 bn [S1]. The Fiscal Council expects both the federal and the sub-national levels to breach the national fiscal rules in 2027–28 [S2].

3 The government's plan and its critics

Table 2: The 2027/28 double budget in numbers. The 2025/26 budget had planned EUR 6.4 bn (2025) and EUR 8.7 bn (2026) [S7].

Item	2027	2028	Source
Net additional consolidation, 2027/28 budget (EUR bn)	1.5	2.5	S6
“Offensive” measures (spending, relief) (EUR bn)	0.6	2.5	S6
Gross additional consolidation (EUR bn)	2.1	5.0	S6
of which below-inflation pension adjustment (EUR bn)	0.27	0.56	S6
Cumulative net consolidation incl. 2025/26 budget, FISK (EUR bn)	9.2	10.7	S2
Deficit, BMF plan (% GDP)	3.5	3.0	S6
Deficit, FISK forecast (% GDP)	3.6	3.8	S2

The consolidation is done in two steps. The 2025/26 budget carried the bulk, including the abolition of the Klimabonus, worth about EUR 2 bn per year [S13]. The 2027/28 budget adds a smaller package (Table 2), whose largest contributions come from companies, banks and state holdings, including a higher corporate tax rate for profits above EUR 1 m and a bank levy extension (Figure 3) [S6]. The largest relief item is a EUR 2 bn cut in employer contributions to the family fund (FLAF) in 2028 [S6].




Figure 3: Composition of the 2028 consolidation measures in the 2027/28 budget, % of total, as presented by the Finance Ministry [S6].

Critiques. The Fiscal Council considers the Ministry's path too optimistic and expects the deficit to stay above 3% through 2030 [S2]. EcoAustria notes that the debt ratio keeps rising to almost 84% even on the government's path, that much of the gross consolidation comes from extra revenue, and that some measures, such as the lower pension adjustment or pension-fund prepayments, only improve the balance temporarily [S30]. The Fiscal Council concludes that consolidation must not stop with this budget and needs structural measures [S31]. On the other side, the Finance Minister argues that 2025 came in better than planned (4.2% against a forecast of 4.5%) and that a growth- and distribution-sensitive consolidation is working [S32].

4 Pillar 1: Make fossil fuels pay their real cost

4.1 Carbon pricing today

Austria has priced CO₂ in heating and transport fuels since October 2022 through its national emissions trading law (NEHG). The price is fixed by law and has been frozen at EUR 55/t from 2025 until the EU's second emissions trading system (ETS2) takes over in 2028, after the EU postponed ETS2 by one year [S11]. In 2025 national CO₂ pricing raised EUR 1.42 bn and EU ETS auctions another EUR 0.30 bn [S12]. Since the Klimabonus was abolished, this revenue goes to the general budget instead of being paid back to households [S13].




Figure 4: National CO₂ price under the NEHG, EUR per tonne. 2023 was cut from the legislated EUR 35 by the price-stability mechanism. From 2028 the price is set by the EU ETS2 market; the dashed line marks the EUR 45/t (2020 prices) reference level above which the EU can intervene. Sources: S11, S14.

What a higher price could raise. Dividing 2025 revenue by the EUR 55 price implies a priced base of about 25.8 Mt CO₂. This is only an approximation, because cash receipts in 2025 include some payments for late 2024 at EUR 45/t, and exempt or relieved uses are not visible [S12]. Each additional EUR 10/t on that base would gross roughly 0.26 bn per year before behavioural responses. From 2028 Austria cannot simply set its own price on top of ETS2 without further legal analysis; this is an open question this report does not resolve.

4.2 Climate-harmful subsidies

WIFO estimated climate-harmful subsidies at EUR 4.1–5.7 bn per year (2016–2020 data), of which EUR 2.5–4.0 bn in transport [S15]. Figure 5 shows the largest quantified items.




Figure 5: Largest quantified climate-harmful subsidies in Austria, EUR bn per year (WIFO 2022, as reported in S15). Bars show ranges where WIFO gives one.

These are gross budget costs, not the revenue that abolition would raise: tank tourism, behavioural change and compensation for farmers or hauliers would reduce the yield. Momentum Institut, for example, puts the budget gain from abolishing the diesel privilege at about EUR 0.5 bn [S16], at the bottom of WIFO's range.

4.3 The climate target is also a budget risk




Figure 6: Austria's emissions outside the EU ETS (Effort Sharing sector), Mt CO₂e. The 2030 'existing measures' projection is from 2023; a 2026 projection cited in parliament still shows a shortfall of at least 6.9 Mt. 2024 value derived from the statement that the 43 Mt annual target was undercut by about 0.3 Mt. Sources: S17–S19.

The 2030 target implies non-ETS emissions of about 29.2 Mt (56.2×0.52), roughly a third below 2024. Austria did not need to buy allowances for 2021–2025 [S33], but the gap opens later in the decade. The Environment Agency names a rapid cut in climate-harmful subsidies as one of the decisive measures for reaching the target [S34]. Every tonne Austria fails to cut domestically may eventually have to be bought from another member state at a price nobody can forecast today, which makes climate policy a hedge for the budget, not only a cost.

5 Pillar 2: Shift the tax mix

5.1 Labour is taxed heavily

For a single worker on the average wage, the tax wedge in Austria was reported at 47.1% of labour costs in 2025, against an OECD average of 35.1% [S21][S22]. The Austria figure comes from a secondary report of OECD *Taxing Wages 2026* and should be checked against the OECD tables. A revenue-neutral shift from labour to pollution or inherited wealth is the logic behind the classic “green tax reform”: the total burden stays the same, but it falls on things that cause harm or were not earned rather than on work.

5.2 Inheritance and property

Austria has levied no inheritance or gift tax since August 2008 [S26]. (The background, a Constitutional Court ruling on the old valuation rules, is stated here from general knowledge and was not re-verified for this report.) Across the OECD, 24 of 37 countries levy inheritance or estate taxes, but on average these raise only 0.5% of total tax revenue in those countries [S23].

Table 3: Revenue estimates for a tax on large inheritances in Austria.

Estimate	EUR bn / year	Notes	Source
SPÖ estimate (EUR 1 m allowance)	0.5–0.7	party estimate	S25
AK / EU-JRC study	0.9–1.8	incl. avoidance; 0.2% of heirs affected at EUR 1 m allowance	S24
Annual inheritance volume, 2025 → 2050	21 → 41	total value inherited, not revenue	S24

The estimates in Table 3 span a factor of more than three, which reflects real uncertainty about avoidance, especially via private foundations (Privatstiftungen) and lifetime gifts. A design that counts gifts and inheritances over a long period against one lifetime allowance, as in the SPÖ model with a 30-year window [S35], addresses the gift loophole; foundations would need explicit rules.

The property tax (Grundsteuer) is the second option. It is still based on unit values whose last general assessment for non-agricultural property took place in 1973 [S27], so its base has drifted far from market values. Because land cannot move abroad, a revaluation is harder to avoid than an inheritance tax. No current revenue estimate for a revaluation was found for this report.

6 Pillar 3: Remove the barriers prices cannot fix

A carbon price changes the relative cost of fossil and clean options, but several barriers respond weakly to price. This section is argument rather than measurement; the points are standard in the climate-policy literature but are not quantified here.

- **Split incentives in rented housing.** Landlords choose the heating system, tenants pay the fuel bill. A price makes tenants poorer without changing the landlord's decision; rules on replacing fossil heating at the point of renovation or re-letting address this directly.
- **Grid and infrastructure first.** Heat pumps, EVs and solar need grid capacity and charging infrastructure planned years ahead by the state and network operators.
- **Upfront costs.** Electrification is often cheaper over its lifetime but more expensive at purchase. Low-interest or pay-as-you-save financing helps households without savings respond to the price.
- **Rural alternatives.** Reforming the commuter allowance is easier to justify, and fairer, where public transport exists. The allowance currently reaches about 700,000 employees [S36].
- **Predictable prices.** A credible, legislated price path matters more to investors than a high price expected to be reversed. Austria's own record (price freeze, Klimabonus abolished, ETS2 delayed) shows how quickly the path can change [S11][S13].

7 Pillar 4: Structural reform

Retirement age. Austria's effective retirement age is well below the statutory age, which WIFO notes leaves considerable room for reform [S37]. Denmark has linked its statutory age to life expectancy since 2006 and has legislated an increase to 70 by 2040 [S28]. A life-expectancy link takes the issue out of the annual political cycle, but it raises equity concerns: people with lower socio-economic status live shorter lives, so a uniform increase cuts their retirement years most, a point raised in research on Denmark and Sweden [S38]. Any such reform therefore needs rules for physically demanding jobs.

Federalism. Länder and municipalities spend money that is mostly raised by the federal government. Under the new Stability Pact their combined 2026 deficit is expected at 1.13% of GDP instead of the 0.7% assumed in spring 2025, so the federal level has to cut more to hold the overall target [S39]. Giving them more responsibility for their own revenue (for example via the Grundsteuer, which already accrues to municipalities [S27]) would align spending and financing decisions.

Debt stabilisation. The Fiscal Council's benchmark is an average deficit of 2.5% of GDP over 2026–2030 to stabilise the debt ratio [S2]. No current forecast reaches this. That is the clearest quantitative argument that Pillars 1 and 2 alone are not enough.

8 Illustrative arithmetic: how far do the green and wealth levers go?

This section is a scenario, not a forecast. It estimates the net annual budget effect of the Pillar 1 and 2 levers in 2028 and compares it with the gap between the Fiscal Council's forecast and the 3% limit.

Assumptions. Nominal GDP in 2028 is projected from 2025 GDP using WIFO's April 2026 real-growth and inflation forecasts, giving about EUR 569 bn; using consumer-price inflation as the GDP deflator is a simplification. The Fiscal Council's 2028 deficit of 3.8% then exceeds the 3% limit by 0.8 percentage points, or about **EUR 4.6 bn**. The CO₂ lever uses the implied priced base of 25.8 Mt, an assumed 10% demand response, and returns half of the extra revenue to low-income and rural households. Shares of the commuter allowance and company-car breaks that are cut are judgement calls. Overlap with measures already in the 2027/28 budget (4% of which targets climate-harmful subsidies [S6]) is ignored, which flatters the result slightly.

Table 4: Illustrative net annual budget effect of Pillar 1 and 2 levers in 2028.

Lever	Low (EUR bn)	High (EUR bn)	Basis
Abolish diesel privilege	0.50	1.10	S16 / S15 (low = Momentum, high = WIFO upper)
Reform commuter allowance (cut 30–60%)	0.15	0.31	S15; share cut = assumption
Cut company-car tax breaks (30–60%)	0.15	0.30	S15; share cut = assumption
CO ₂ price +20–45 EUR/t, net of 10% demand fall and 50% recycling	0.23	0.52	S12 base; all parameters = assumptions
Inheritance tax, EUR 1 m allowance	0.50	1.80	S25 (low) / S24 (high)
Total	1.53	4.03	
<i>Gap to 3% in 2028 (FISK forecast)</i>	<i>4.55</i>	<i>4.55</i>	<i>S2, S6, own calculation</i>




Figure 7: Illustrative range of net budget effects (EUR bn per year, 2028) compared with the gap between the Fiscal Council's forecast and the 3% limit. Light bars: low-to-high range. See Table for assumptions.

Reading the result. On these assumptions the levers raise between EUR 1.5 and 4.0 bn per year, which covers roughly 34–88% of the gap implied by the Fiscal Council's forecast. If instead the Ministry's path holds (3.0% in 2028), there is no gap and the same revenue could fund a cut in labour taxes without worsening the deficit. Either way the conclusion is the same: green and wealth taxes are a meaningful contribution and improve the quality of the tax mix, but on their own they neither close the gap under pessimistic assumptions nor bring the deficit to the 2.5% needed to stabilise debt. The structural measures in Pillar 4 remain necessary.

9 Counterarguments and open uncertainties

From the left. Raising the retirement age hits people in physically demanding jobs hardest, and the Chamber of Labour argues, citing the EU Ageing Report, that the pension system is sustainable in the long run [S9]; wealth could be taxed more heavily, for example via a net-wealth tax, for which WIFO has estimated revenue of about EUR 5 bn

at 1–1.5% on wealth above EUR 1 m, while warning that a national go-it-alone would trigger substantial avoidance [S40].

From the right and business. Austria’s tax burden is already among the highest in Europe, so consolidation should come from spending; an inheritance tax is double taxation, hits family businesses and is expensive to administer; higher energy costs hurt industrial competitiveness. The ÖVP has ruled out an inheritance tax [S41].

Distribution of the green measures. Fuel taxes are regressive without compensation, and the Klimabonus was criticised by WIFO and IHS as poorly targeted [S42]. The package therefore stands or falls with the design of targeted compensation, which this report does not model.

Data uncertainty. Several inputs are ranges or old estimates: the WIFO subsidy study uses 2016–2020 data, the non-ETS projection plotted here is from 2023, revenue estimates for an inheritance tax differ by a factor of three, and the priced CO2 base is an approximation. Values read from chart labels (forecast paths, macro forecasts) could be off by rounding. The arithmetic in Section 8 should be read as an order of magnitude.

10 Appendix A: All numbers used

Every value used in text, tables or figures, with its source key (see Appendix B). “Chart label” means the value was read from a data label in the source’s chart; “older vintage” means later statistical revisions may differ; “derived” values are calculated as noted.

ID	Description	Value	Unit	Src	Note
rev_2022	General govt revenue 2022	222.7	EUR bn	S1	
rev_2023	General govt revenue 2023	237.7	EUR bn	S1	
rev_2024	General govt revenue 2024	250.2	EUR bn	S1	
rev_2025	General govt revenue 2025	261.5	EUR bn	S1	
exp_2022	General govt expenditure 2022	238	EUR bn	S1	
exp_2023	General govt expenditure 2023	250	EUR bn	S1	
exp_2024	General govt expenditure 2024	273.2	EUR bn	S1	
exp_2025	General govt expenditure 2025	283	EUR bn	S1	
gdp_2022	Nominal GDP 2022	449.4	EUR bn	S1	
gdp_2023	Nominal GDP 2023	477.8	EUR bn	S1	
gdp_2024	Nominal GDP 2024	494.1	EUR bn	S1	
gdp_2025	Nominal GDP 2025	512.8	EUR bn	S1	
exp_socia_2022	Expenditure: Social benefits 2022	100.8	EUR bn	S1	
exp_socia_2023	Expenditure: Social benefits 2023	108.4	EUR bn	S1	
exp_socia_2024	Expenditure: Social benefits 2024	119.7	EUR bn	S1	
exp_socia_2025	Expenditure: Social benefits 2025	127	EUR bn	S1	
exp_perso_2022	Expenditure: Personnel 2022	46.6	EUR bn	S1	
exp_perso_2023	Expenditure: Personnel 2023	50.6	EUR bn	S1	
exp_perso_2024	Expenditure: Personnel 2024	56	EUR bn	S1	
exp_perso_2025	Expenditure: Personnel 2025	58.8	EUR bn	S1	
exp_goods_2022	Expenditure: Goods & services 2022	31.7	EUR bn	S1	
exp_goods_2023	Expenditure: Goods & services 2023	33.1	EUR bn	S1	
exp_goods_2024	Expenditure: Goods & services 2024	34.9	EUR bn	S1	
exp_goods_2025	Expenditure: Goods & services 2025	36.1	EUR bn	S1	
exp_inves_2022	Expenditure: Investment 2022	19.5	EUR bn	S1	
exp_inves_2023	Expenditure: Investment 2023	18.1	EUR bn	S1	
exp_inves_2024	Expenditure: Investment 2024	19.9	EUR bn	S1	
exp_inves_2025	Expenditure: Investment 2025	20.3	EUR bn	S1	
exp_subsi_2022	Expenditure: Subsidies 2022	11.8	EUR bn	S1	
exp_subsi_2023	Expenditure: Subsidies 2023	10.7	EUR bn	S1	
exp_subsi_2024	Expenditure: Subsidies 2024	9.2	EUR bn	S1	
exp_subsi_2025	Expenditure: Subsidies 2025	8.6	EUR bn	S1	
exp_inter_2022	Expenditure: Interest 2022	4.3	EUR bn	S1	
exp_inter_2023	Expenditure: Interest 2023	5.7	EUR bn	S1	

ID	Description	Value	Unit	Src	Note
exp_inter_2024	Expenditure: Interest 2024	7.3	EUR bn	S1	
exp_inter_2025	Expenditure: Interest 2025	8.3	EUR bn	S1	
exp_other_2022	Expenditure: Other 2022	23.4	EUR bn	S1	
exp_other_2023	Expenditure: Other 2023	23.4	EUR bn	S1	
exp_other_2024	Expenditure: Other 2024	26.1	EUR bn	S1	
exp_other_2025	Expenditure: Other 2025	24	EUR bn	S1	
bal_2019	Govt balance 2019 (first release)	0.6	% GDP	S3	older vintage
bal_2020	Govt balance 2020 (revised, Apr 2022 vintage)	-8	% GDP	S4	older vintage
bal_2021	Govt balance 2021 (prelim., Apr 2022 vintage)	-5.9	% GDP	S4	older vintage
bal_2022	Govt balance 2022	-3.4	% GDP	S1	
bal_2023	Govt balance 2023	-2.6	% GDP	S1	
bal_2024	Govt balance 2024	-4.6	% GDP	S1	
bal_2025	Govt balance 2025	-4.2	% GDP	S1	
debt_2019	Debt ratio end-2019	70.6	% GDP	S5	older vintage
debt_2020	Debt ratio end-2020	82.9	% GDP	S5	older vintage
debt_2021	Debt ratio end-2021 (Apr 2022 vintage)	82.8	% GDP	S4	older vintage
debt_2022	Debt ratio 2022 (read from chart label)	78.1	% GDP	S2	
debt_2023	Debt ratio 2023 (read from chart label)	77.8	% GDP	S2	
debt_2024	Debt ratio 2024	80	% GDP	S1	
debt_2025	Debt ratio 2025	81.5	% GDP	S1	
fisk_bal_2026	Fiscal Council forecast balance 2026	-3.9	% GDP	S2	chart label
fisk_bal_2027	Fiscal Council forecast balance 2027	-3.6	% GDP	S2	chart label
fisk_bal_2028	Fiscal Council forecast balance 2028	-3.8	% GDP	S2	chart label
fisk_bal_2029	Fiscal Council forecast balance 2029	-3.6	% GDP	S2	chart label
fisk_bal_2030	Fiscal Council forecast balance 2030	-3.7	% GDP	S2	chart label
fisk_debt_2026	Fiscal Council forecast debt 2026	83.3	% GDP	S2	chart label
fisk_debt_2027	Fiscal Council forecast debt 2027	84.5	% GDP	S2	chart label
fisk_debt_2028	Fiscal Council forecast debt 2028	85.5	% GDP	S2	chart label
fisk_debt_2029	Fiscal Council forecast debt 2029	86.6	% GDP	S2	chart label
fisk_debt_2030	Fiscal Council forecast debt 2030	87.8	% GDP	S2	chart label
bmf_bal_2026	Finance Ministry plan balance 2026	-4.2	% GDP	S6	chart label
bmf_bal_2027	Finance Ministry plan balance 2027	-3.5	% GDP	S6	chart label
bmf_bal_2028	Finance Ministry plan balance 2028	-3	% GDP	S6	chart label
bmf_bal_2029	Finance Ministry plan balance 2029	-2.8	% GDP	S6	chart label
bmf_bal_2030	Finance Ministry plan balance 2030	-2.9	% GDP	S6	chart label
bmf_debt_2026	Finance Ministry plan debt 2026	82.9	% GDP	S6	chart label

ID	Description	Value	Unit	Src	Note
bmf_debt_2027	Finance Ministry plan debt 2027	83.6	% GDP	S6	chart label
bmf_debt_2028	Finance Ministry plan debt 2028	83.8	% GDP	S6	chart label
bmf_debt_2029	Finance Ministry plan debt 2029	84.2	% GDP	S6	chart label
bmf_debt_2030	Finance Ministry plan debt 2030	84.6	% GDP	S6	chart label
bmf_nocons_bal_2026	BMF: balance without consolidation 2026	-5.9	% GDP	S6	chart label
bmf_nocons_bal_2027	BMF: balance without consolidation 2027	-5.6	% GDP	S6	chart label
bmf_nocons_bal_2028	BMF: balance without consolidation 2028	-5.5	% GDP	S6	chart label
bmf_nocons_bal_2029	BMF: balance without consolidation 2029	-5.4	% GDP	S6	chart label
bmf_nocons_bal_2030	BMF: balance without consolidation 2030	-5.4	% GDP	S6	chart label
bmf_nocons_debt_2026	BMF: debt without consolidation 2026	85.8	% GDP	S6	chart label
bmf_nocons_debt_2027	BMF: debt without consolidation 2027	88.5	% GDP	S6	chart label
bmf_nocons_debt_2028	BMF: debt without consolidation 2028	91.1	% GDP	S6	chart label
bmf_nocons_debt_2029	BMF: debt without consolidation 2029	93.8	% GDP	S6	chart label
bmf_nocons_debt_2030	BMF: debt without consolidation 2030	96.5	% GDP	S6	chart label
fisk_stab	Avg deficit 2026-30 needed to stabilise debt ratio	2.5	% GDP	S2	
g_2024	Real GDP growth 2024 (WIFO Apr 2026)	-0.7	%	S6	chart label
cpi_2024	Inflation 2024 (WIFO Apr 2026)	2.9	%	S6	chart label
g_2025	Real GDP growth 2025 (WIFO Apr 2026)	0.6	%	S6	chart label
cpi_2025	Inflation 2025 (WIFO Apr 2026)	3.6	%	S6	chart label
g_2026	Real GDP growth 2026 (WIFO Apr 2026)	0.9	%	S6	chart label
cpi_2026	Inflation 2026 (WIFO Apr 2026)	2.7	%	S6	chart label
g_2027	Real GDP growth 2027 (WIFO Apr 2026)	1.3	%	S6	chart label
cpi_2027	Inflation 2027 (WIFO Apr 2026)	2.3	%	S6	chart label
g_2028	Real GDP growth 2028 (WIFO Apr 2026)	1.2	%	S6	chart label
cpi_2028	Inflation 2028 (WIFO Apr 2026)	2.1	%	S6	chart label
sub_Fede	Deficit 2025, Federal sector	15.2	EUR bn	S1	
sub_Länd	Deficit 2025, Länder sector	2.3	EUR bn	S1	
sub_Muni	Deficit 2025, Municipalities sector	3.3	EUR bn	S1	
sub_Soci	Deficit 2025, Social security sector	0.6	EUR bn	S1	

ID	Description	Value	Unit	Src	Note
cons_2025_plan	Consolidation 2025 (2025/26 budget, as planned)	6.4	EUR bn	S7	
cons_2026_plan	Consolidation 2026 (2025/26 budget, as planned)	8.7	EUR bn	S7	
net_2027	Net additional consolidation 2027 (2027/28 budget)	1.5	EUR bn	S6	
net_2028	Net additional consolidation 2028 (2027/28 budget)	2.5	EUR bn	S6	
off_2027	Offensive (spending/relief) measures 2027	0.6	EUR bn	S6	
off_2028	Offensive (spending/relief) measures 2028	2.5	EUR bn	S6	
gross_2027	Gross consolidation 2027	2.1	EUR bn	S6	
gross_2028	Gross consolidation 2028	5	EUR bn	S6	
fisk_net_2026	Fiscal Council: cumulative net consolidation 2026	6.7	EUR bn	S2	
fisk_net_2027	Fiscal Council: cumulative net consolidation 2027	9.2	EUR bn	S2	
fisk_net_2028	Fiscal Council: cumulative net consolidation 2028	10.7	EUR bn	S2	
flaf_2028	Cut in employer FLAF contribution 2028 (cost)	2	EUR bn	S6	
pens_adj_2027	Saving from below-inflation pension adjustment 2027	0.273	EUR bn	S6	
pens_adj_2028	Saving from below-inflation pension adjustment 2028	0.559	EUR bn	S6	
share28_Compan	Share of 2028 consolidation measures: Companies, banks, state holdings	44	%	S6	
share28_Social	Share of 2028 consolidation measures: Social insurance stabilisation	13	%	S6	
share28_Higher	Share of 2028 consolidation measures: Higher earners	12	%	S6	
share28_Admini	Share of 2028 consolidation measures: Administration & other	12	%	S6	
share28_Employ	Share of 2028 consolidation measures: Employees	9	%	S6	
share28_Family	Share of 2028 consolidation measures: Family benefits	6	%	S6	
share28_Climat	Share of 2028 consolidation measures: Climate-harmful subsidies	4	%	S6	
pv_2018	Federal transfers to pension insurance 2018	2.45	% GDP	S8	

ID	Description	Value	Unit	Src	Note
pv_2024	Federal transfers to pension insurance 2024	3.45	% GDP	S8	
pv_2030	Federal transfers to pension insurance 2030 (projection)	4.23	% GDP	S8	
ar_2013	Public pension spending 2013 (Ageing Report 2024)	13.8	% GDP	S9	as cited by AK Wien
ar_2070	Public pension spending 2070 (Ageing Report 2024)	14	% GDP	S9	as cited by AK Wien
kp_2024	Cost of ending bracket creep ('kalte Progression') 2024	3.5	EUR bn	S10	Finance Minister statement 2023
wedge_at	Tax wedge, single average worker, Austria 2025	47.1	% labour cost	S21	secondary report of OECD data
wedge_oecd	Tax wedge, single average worker, OECD avg 2025	35.1	% labour cost	S22	
co2_2022	National CO2 price 2022	30	EUR/t	S11	
co2_2023	National CO2 price 2023	32.5	EUR/t	S11	
co2_2024	National CO2 price 2024	45	EUR/t	S11	
co2_2025	National CO2 price 2025	55	EUR/t	S11	
co2_2026	National CO2 price 2026	55	EUR/t	S11	
co2_2027	National CO2 price 2027	55	EUR/t	S11	
nehg_rev_2025	Revenue national CO2 pricing 2025 (cash basis)	1.4166	EUR bn	S12	incl. some Q4 2024 payments
ets_rev_2025	Revenue EU ETS auctions 2025	0.3026	EUR bn	S12	
klimabonus	Annual saving from abolishing Klimabonus	2	EUR bn	S13	approx.
ets2_ref	ETS2 price-intervention reference level (2020 prices)	45	EUR/t	S14	
wifo_lo	Climate-harmful subsidies, lower bound (WIFO 2022)	4.1	EUR bn/yr	S15	
wifo_hi	Climate-harmful subsidies, upper bound (WIFO 2022)	5.7	EUR bn/yr	S15	
wifo_tr_lo	of which transport, lower	2.5	EUR bn/yr	S15	
wifo_tr_hi	of which transport, upper	4	EUR bn/yr	S15	
sub_Diesel_lo	WIFO: Diesel tax privilege (low)	0.54	EUR bn/yr	S15	
sub_Diesel_hi	WIFO: Diesel tax privilege (high)	1.1	EUR bn/yr	S15	
sub_Manufa_lo	WIFO: Manufacturer privilege (energy) (low)	0.678	EUR bn/yr	S15	

ID	Description	Value	Unit	Src	Note
sub_Commut_lo	WIFO: Commuter allowance + Pendlereuro (low)	0.51	EUR bn/yr	S15	
sub_Compan_lo	WIFO: Company-car tax breaks (low)	0.5	EUR bn/yr	S15	
mom_diesel	Momentum Institut: revenue from abolishing diesel privilege	0.5	EUR bn/yr	S16	
ghg_2024	Total GHG emissions 2024	66.6	Mt CO2e	S17	
ne_2005	Non-ETS emissions 2005 (base year)	56.2	Mt CO2e	S18	
ne_2024	Non-ETS emissions 2024 (target 43 Mt undercut by ~0.3)	42.7	Mt CO2e	S17	derived: 43 - 0.3
ne_2030_wem	Non-ETS 2030, 'existing measures' projection (2023)	41.69	Mt CO2e	S18	older projection
esr_target	Non-ETS reduction target 2030 vs 2005	48	%	S17	
uba_gap	Latest UBA projection: shortfall vs 2030 target, at least	6.9	Mt CO2e	S19	as cited in a parliamentary motion
rh_cost	Court of Audit: possible cost of missing targets (2021 est.), up to	9.2	EUR bn	S20	
oecd_inh_share	Inheritance/estate/gift taxes, share of total tax revenue (OECD avg of levying countries)	0.5	%	S23	
oecd_inh_n	OECD countries levying inheritance/estate tax (of 37)	24	count	S23	
inh_vol_2025	Annual inheritance volume Austria 2025	21	EUR bn	S24	
inh_vol_2050	Annual inheritance volume Austria 2050 (projection)	41	EUR bn	S24	
inh_rev_lo	Inheritance tax revenue estimate incl. avoidance, low	0.9	EUR bn/yr	S24	
inh_rev_hi	Inheritance tax revenue estimate incl. avoidance, high	1.8	EUR bn/yr	S24	
inh_share_heirs	Share of heirs affected at EUR 1m allowance	0.2	%	S24	
spo_lo	SPÖ estimate of inheritance tax revenue, low	0.5	EUR bn/yr	S25	
spo_hi	SPÖ estimate of inheritance tax revenue, high	0.7	EUR bn/yr	S25	
dk_age	Denmark statutory retirement age from 2040	70	years	S28	
gdp_2028_proj	Projected nominal GDP 2028	569.0	EUR bn	calc.	2025 GDP × $\Pi(1+g)(1+\pi)$, 2026–28
gap_2028	Gap FISK 2028 deficit vs 3% limit	4.55	EUR bn	calc.	0.8 pp × GDP 2028

ID	Description	Value	Unit	Src	Note
co2_base	Implied priced CO2 base	25.8	Mt	calc.	ne-hg_rev_2025 / 55
target_2030	Non-ETS 2030 target level	29.2	Mt CO2e	calc.	$56.2 \times (1 - 0.48)$
lever_lo	Total levers, low	1.53	EUR bn	calc.	Table: levers
lever_hi	Total levers, high	4.03	EUR bn	calc.	Table: levers

11 Appendix B: Sources

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- **S4** Tiroler Tageszeitung / APA (Apr 2022), “Budget-Defizit sank auf knapp sechs Prozent”. tt.com/artikel/18671056
- **S5** BMF (2023), Beilage “Öffentliche Schulden 2023” (debt 70.6% end-2019, 82.9% end-2020). service.bmf.gv.at
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- **S19** Parliamentary motion 885/A XXVIII. GP (2026), citing UBA projection. parlament.gv.at
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- **S36** Der Standard (2024), “Privileg für die Ewigkeit”. derstandard.at/story/3000000202960

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